Business Workshop: Part-time is optional, Cash or accrual?

By: Tony J. Thompson, Esquire tjt@muslaw.com

A federal appeals court recently confirmed that employers do not have to accommodate employees who want to return from Family and Medical Leave and switch from full-time to part-time work.

In the case in question, the employee requested and received leave from a manufacturer after suffering a nervous breakdown.

After using up her 12 weeks of FMLA leave, the employee said she still could not work full time and asked to go on a part-time schedule.

The company insisted that she could get only her full-time job back and fired her. The employee sued, alleging the company interfered with her FMLA rights and discriminated against her because of her disability.

The district court dismissed the case after the company proved that it did not have any part-time positions that were comparable to the employee's full-time work.

The appeals court agreed, stating that the FMLA does not require accommodation when the employee cannot return to the same or a comparable job.

During FMLA leave, an employer may have to provide reduced schedule leave to eligible employees.

But once employees have exhausted FMLA leave, the law does not require employers either to hold the job open or to change a full-time position into a part-time one.

The FMLA covers employers with 50 or more employees and entitles eligible employees to take unpaid leave of up to 12 weeks for the care of a newborn child or an immediate family member with a serious health condition or to take medical leave when the employee is unable to work because of a serious health condition.

Supreme Court Declines To Make Definitive Ruling on Admissibility of “Me Too” Evidence

By: Elaina Smiley, Esquire es@muslaw.com

Often in discrimination cases, employees attempt to introduce evidence of alleged discriminatory acts against other employees to bolster their claims. The Supreme Court in Sprint v. Mendelsohn, declined to make a determinative ruling on whether or not this type of evidence is admissible. Mendelsohn was terminated by Sprint as part of an company-wide reduction in force and then sued Sprint for age discrimination. In support of her claim, Mendelsohn sought to introduce the testimony of five other former Sprint employees who claimed that their supervisors had discriminated against them because of their age. None of the five employees worked in the same group as Mendelsohn or under the same supervisors. The District Court ruled that the evidence was not admissible because the five employees were not similarly situated to the plaintiff. The Tenth Circuit found that the District Court abused its discretion. The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court which found that the question of whether evidence of discrimination by other supervisors is relevant to Mendelsohn’s age claims depends on many factors, including “how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff’s circumstances and theory of the case.” The Supreme Court concluded that such evidence is “neither per se admissible nor per se inadmissible.” The Supreme Court remanded the case to the District Court to clarify its ruling. The Supreme Court’s decision leaves the door open for plaintiffs in all types of discrimination claims to attempt to bring in evidence of discriminatory conduct against employees who are not part of the lawsuit. This ruling leaves much discretion to the trial court in making the determination of the admissibility of “me too” evidence.